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GUARANTEEING THE DIVERSITY OF NUMBER
GENERATORS
ADI SHAMIR AND BOAZ TSABAN
Abstract. A major problem in using iterative number generators
of the form xi = f(xi−1) is that they can enter unexpectedly short
cycles. This is hard to analyze when the generator is designed, hard
to detect in real time when the generator is used, and can have
devastating cryptanalytic implications. In this paper we define
a measure of security, called sequence diversity, which generalizes
the notion of cycle-length for non-iterative generators. We then
introduce the class of counter assisted generators, and show how
to turn any iterative generator (even a bad one designed or seeded
by an adversary) into a counter assisted generator with a provably
high diversity, without reducing the quality of generators which
are already cryptographically strong.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of generating long crypto-
graphically secure sequences by iterative number generators which start
at some seed value x0 = s, and extend it by computing xi = f(xi−1)
where f is some function. The ith output of the generator is a (typi-
cally shorter) value yi = g(xi) derived from the internal state by some
output function g (Figure 1). If f is a secret keyed function, then g
may be the identity.
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Figure 1.
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A major application of number generators is to encrypt cleartexts
by xoring them with the generated outputs. In this case, the seed s
is a secret key which is shared by the communicating parties, but is
unknown to the eavesdropping adversary.
Since the state space is finite, the sequence of internal states xi will
eventually become periodic with some period p, i.e., xi = xi+p for
all i larger than some i0. Any cycling of the state sequence causes a
cycling of the output sequence with period at most p. A particularly
worrisome problem is the possibility that i0 and p may be unexpectedly
small, and therefore the cycling point i0 + p is actually achieved. This
can happen even in very complex generators. An interesting example
is Knuth’s “Super-random” number generator (Algorithm K) [9, §3.1],
which converges rapidly to a fixed point (that is, i0 is very small, and
p = 1).
If the cycling point i0 + p is achieved, then the xor of the ith and
i+pth ciphertexts is equal to the xor of the ith and i+pth cleartexts,
for all i ≥ i0. If the cleartexts have a sufficiently high redundancy,
the cryptanalyst can detect the cycling by noticing the non-uniform
statistics of such xor’s, and then recover the actual cleartexts from
their known pairwise xor’s. Even if the cleartexts have no redun-
dancy, knowledge of some cleartexts will make it possible to find other
cleartexts encrypted with the same repeated values.
1.1. Partial solutions.
1.1.1. Online monitoring. A possible solution to this problem is to
monitor each execution in real time. If a particular seed leads to early
cycling, the cryptographic operation is stopped and the seed is re-
placed. However, this can be very disruptive if the exchange of new
seeds is time consuming or difficult to arrange. Note further that real
time detection of cycling behavior using hash tables requires a very
large memory, whereas other methods such as Floyd’s two pointer cy-
cle detection algorithm (see, e.g., [9, p. 7]) are not guaranteed to detect
cycles as soon as they are entered.
1.1.2. Experimental testings. The designer of the generator can test its
behavior by applying f a limited number of times to a limited number
of random seeds (see [2]). However, such testing cannot be exhaustive,
and thus even if no cycling is ever detected in these tests, the next seed
or the next step can lead to a cycling.
1.1.3. Pseudorandom functions. Pseudorandom functions f : X → X
are functions which are chosen from the space of all possible functions
g : X → X with a relatively low-entropy distribution, but which are
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difficult to tell apart from truly random functions (which are selected
from the space of all possible functions g : X → X with uniform distri-
bution). For any adversary with unlimited computational power and
access to a polynomial (in log |X|) number of values of a pseudoran-
dom function f , the probability that the adversary can tell that these
values came from f rather than from a truly random g should be neg-
ligible. Pseudorandom permutations and pseudorandom sequences are
defined similarly to be low-entropy but difficult to distinguish from
truly random permutations and sequences, respectively. For more pre-
cise definitions see, [20], [7], [10], [13, §2.2], and references therein.
It is easy to see (and well known) that sequences generated by itera-
tive number generators with pseudorandom functions f are pseudoran-
dom. Thus, the probability that such a generator enters a small cycle
is negligible. However, all known constructions of pseudorandom func-
tions are slow and are based on unproved conjectures (see [16, §17.9]).
In fact, all practical functions used in cryptography are ad-hoc con-
structions which are not proved to be pseudorandom, and nothing is
known about the actual structure of the cycles they generate.1 This
is particularly worrisome for the user, since there is no guarantee that
the generators that he uses do not contain a trapdoor leading to short
cycles.2
1.1.4. Mathematically structured generators. The need to avoid short
cycles is the major motivation behind the development of several fam-
ilies of generators based on mathematical structures. These families
include: Linear congruential generators, linear feedback shift registers
(LFSR’s), clock-controlled LFSR’s, additive generators, feedback with
carry shift registers, 1/p generators (see [16, §§16–17] and references
therein), and TSR’s [18]. Under certain conditions, these families can
be proved to have large cycles.
The drawback of this approach is that their mathematical structure
can be often used to cryptanalyze them (see [16, loc. cit.] for references
to cryptanalysis of various implementations of the mentioned genera-
tors).
1.1.5. Re-keying. Chambers [3] suggested a technique to reduce the risk
of short cycles by restarting the generator’s internal state every fixed
number of iterations, with a new key seed taken from a “re-keying”
1 A notable exception appears in [8] and [5], where the cycle structure of non-
linear feedback shift registers is studied. However, the obtained results cover only
degenerate cases. Moreover, in [8] it is proved that the studied generators must
have short cycles.
2Knuth’s example could be viewed as such a trapdoor generator.
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generator which has a provably large cycle (e.g., one of the generators
mentioned in Section 1.1.4).
Given an iterative generator, let pk, k = 1, 2, . . . , be the probability
that the cycling point of the generator occurs after at least k iterations.
Assume that we use the generator to get an output sequence of size
m. The probability that we do not reach the cycling point in the usual
iterative mode is pm. Now, if we re-key the generator every k iterations,
then the probability that we do not reach the cycling point even once
is p
m/k
k . As nothing is known on the cycle structure of the generator,
there is no guarantee that p
m/k
k is greater than pm. It may thus be
the case that the re-keying mode is worse than the standard iterative
mode.
Moreover, if the re-keying generator is cryptographically weak, then
it could be cryptanalyzed from the outputs which come immediately
after the re-keying phases.
One should note further that, as Schneier points out in [16, §17.11],
algorithms that have a long key setup routine are not suitable for this
mode.
1.1.6. Similarity transformations and counter-mode. Another possible
solution is to take some simple permutation u which is guaranteed to
have long cycles (e.g., u(x) = x + 1 (mod n), or any of the examples
from Section 1.1.4), and then to use fuf−1 (instead of f) as the it-
eration function. This similarity transformation has the same cycle
structure as u.
Such a construction is, though, rather degenerate. Let 〈f, g〉 stand
for a generator whose iteration function is f , and whose output function
is g. Consider a generator of the form 〈fuf−1, g〉. Define g˜ = g ◦ f .
Then for all seeds s, setting s˜ = f−1(s) implies that the ith output
is g((fuf−1)i(s)) = g(fuif−1(s)) = (g ◦ f)(ui(s˜)) = g˜(ui(s˜)), that
is, the generator is equivalent to the generator 〈u, g˜〉. This means
that the modified generator is equivalent to another generator with a
cryptographically weak iteration function.
For u(x) = x+1 (mod n) we conclude that for some g˜, the ith output
of the generator equals g˜(s˜+i). Generators of the form yi = g(s+i) are
called counter-mode generators, and are a standard mode of operation
[16, §9.9]. However, such generators have the following unpleasant
property: The difference of any two input values s+ i and s+ j to g is
simply i− j. If i is close to j, then i− j has a small Hamming weight.
This fact could be used in differential or correlation cryptanalysis of g.
This is also the case for other choices of u, e.g., if u is an LFSR, then
ui(s) and uj(s) are equal in all except for i− j bits.
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2. The diversity of sequence generators
In this section we propose a new notion of security for sequence
generators, which generalizes the cryptographically desirable concept
of long cycles.
We first define the notion of diversity for a single infinite sequence.
Definition 2.1. The diversity of a sequence ~x = (x0, x1, x2, . . .) is the
function D~x(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . defined as the minimum number of
distinct values occurring in any contiguous subsequence xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+k−1
of length k in ~x.
All of the sequences considered in this paper have a finite sample
space of |X| = n possible values. For any sequence ~x in X ,
1 ≤ D~x(k) ≤ D~x(k + 1) ≤ D~x(k) + 1 ≤ n.
In other words, the diversity grows monotonically and at most linearly
with k, and cannot exceed n.
We now generalize the concept from sequences to generators. We
first define the types of generators considered in this paper:
Definition 2.2. An iterative generator is a structure G = 〈X, Y, f :
X → X, g : X → Y 〉, where for all x ∈ X , f(x) and g(x) can be
computed in polynomial time from x. X is the state space, and Y is
the output space. We may write G = 〈f, g〉 for short, or G : xi = f(xi−1)
if the output function is not relevant. For a generator G : xi = f(xi−1)
and seed s ∈ X , we denote the state sequence (x0 = s, x1, . . . ) of the
generated internal states by G(s).
We wish to bound from below the diversity of the sequences of in-
ternal states generated from possible seeds.
Definition 2.3. The diversity of an iterative generator G : xi =
f(xi−1) is the function
DG(k) = min{DG(s)(k) : s ∈ X}
defined for k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The total diversity of G is the limit limk→∞DG(k).3
Iterative generators on finite spaces have simple diversity functions.
3 Anderson, et. al., [2] suggested a statistically-oriented notion of diversity for
random number generators, based on experimental testings of the generator. These
testings give estimations for the average case behavior, whereas our notion bounds
the worst case behavior of the generator. Moreover, the combinatorial nature of
our notion will make it possible to use mathematical theory in order to apply it
to cases where experimental testings are not suitable (e.g., when the state space is
huge). See also Section 1.1.2.
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Lemma 2.4. Assume that G : xi = f(xi−1) is an iterative generator.
(1) Let ~x be a sequence (of internal states) created by G. Then
D~x(k) = min{k, p} where p is the length of the cycle that ~x
enters into.
(2) DG(k) = min{k, p} where p is the length of the shortest cycle
in f .
Proof. ~x has distinct values before it enters the cycle and while it com-
pletes the first traversal of the cycle. This implies (1), and (2) follows
from (1). 
The diversity of an iterative generator is thus directly related to the
size of its smallest cycle. It is intended to capture one aspect of the
worst case behavior of a generator, in the sense that generators with
provably high diversity cannot repeat a small number of internal states
a large number of times as a result of an unlucky or adversarial choice
of seed.
The diversity measure can be applied to noniterative generators, in
which the computation of xi may depend on its index i as well.
Definition 2.5. A counter-dependent generator is a structure G =
〈X, Y, F : X × N → X, g : X → Y 〉, where for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N,
F (x, i) and g(x) can be computed in polynomial time from x. X is the
state space, and Y is the output space. In this type of generators, the
next state is calculated by xi = F (xi−1, i). Here too, we denote the
state sequence (x0 = s, x1, . . . ) of generated internal states by G(s).
Note that iterative as well as counter-mode generators are particular
cases of counter-dependent generators. A straightforward generaliza-
tion of Definition 2.3 for counter-dependent generators is:
Definition 2.6.
(1) The diversity of a counter-dependent generator G : xi = F (xi−1, i)
is the function DG(k) = min{DG(s)(k) : s ∈ X} defined for
k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. The total diversity DtotalG of G is the limit
limk→∞DG(k).
(2) A counter-dependent generator G : xi = F (xi−1, i) is g(k)-
diverse if DG(k) ≥ g(k) for all k = 1, 2, . . ..
The diversity of a general counter-dependent generator can grow and
freeze in an irregular way when k increases, since these generators are
not forced into a cycle when they accidentally repeat the same xi value.
The diversity function is thus a natural generalization of the notion of
cycle size.
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3. Modifying generators
In this section we consider several ways in which we can modify a
given iterative generator in order to increase its diversity. The main
intuitive conditions we impose on this process are:
Condition 3.1. We do not want to design the new generator from
scratch. We usually prefer to use known and well studied primitives
such as DES, RC5 or nonlinear feedback shift registers, for which highly
optimized code can be easily obtained or reused from other parts of
the application. We thus want the modified design to use the same
cryptographic ingredients as the original design.
Condition 3.2. The computational complexity of the modified next-
state function must not be significantly greater that that of the original
one.
Condition 3.3. The modification technique should be uniformly ap-
plicable to all iterative generators, treating them as black boxes. We
do not want the modification to be based on the mathematical or sta-
tistical properties of the given iteration function f . In particular, we
can not assume that we know the structure of its cycles.
Condition 3.4. We are more interested in increasing the diversity of
the interval values xi than in increasing the diversity of the output
values yi = g(xi): If the given generator uses an output function g
with a small range (e.g., a single bit) applying diversity measures to
the output values is meaningless.
The modification should be a win/win situation: If the given genera-
tor has a low diversity, the problem should be rectified, but if the given
generator is already strong, we do not want the modification to weaken
it. The problem is that we do not have a general quantitative definition
of the “goodness” of generators, except when they are “perfect”. We
thus concentrate in this paper on the following formal interpretation.
Condition 3.5.
(1) For any given iteration function, the modified generator should
be g(k)-diverse for some g(k) which is exponential in log n.
(2) If the iteration function f is pseudorandom, then the state se-
quences generated from random seeds by the modified generator
should be pseudorandom.
As in counter-mode (see Section 1.1.6), our black box modification
technique is based on turning the iterative generator into a counter-
dependent generator, allowing xi to depend on i in addition to xi−1.
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To sharpen our intuition, let us consider some bad constructions. (In
the following examples and throughout the paper, the state space X is
identified with the set {0, 1, . . . , n−1}, and addition in the state space
is carried modulo n.)
Example 3.6. xi = i. This function has maximal diversity, but poor
cryptographic quality.
Example 3.7. xi = f(i). This is the standard counter-mode. Perfect
generators remain perfect, but for a constant f the diversity is 1.
Example 3.8. xi = f(i) + i. This is a simple combination of the
previous two examples. Perfect generators remain perfect, but for
f(x) = −x, all the generated xi are 0, and thus the diversity is 1.
Example 3.9. xi = f(xi−1 + i). This is an attempt to force the next
state to depend both on the previous state and on the index. Perfect
generators remain perfect, but the generated sequence has diversity 1
when f is a constant function.
Example 3.10. xi = f(xi−1 + i) + i. This is the “kitchen sink” ap-
proach, trying to combine all the ingredients in all possible ways. How-
ever, when the function f is f(x) = −x, the sequence generated from
any initial seed x0 = s is s,−s, s,−s, s,−s, . . . which contains at most
two values.
Considering these counterexamples, the reader may suspect that all
black box modifications are bad (for some f). In the next section we
show that this is not the case.
4. A provably good modification technique
Given an iterative generator 〈f, g〉, we apply the following black-box
modification.
Definition 4.1. A counter-assisted generator 〈f, g〉 is a generator in
which x0 = s, and for all i ≥ 1 xi = f(xi−1) + i (mod n), where n is
the size of the state space, and the ith output is g(xi) (see Figure 2).
Since it is easy to maintain or obtain a counter for the number of
values produced so far (in many applications, one can use either the
loop counter or the running block-number as a counter for the counter-
assisted mode), and no change is made in the function f or g, the
modification technique is completely trivial and can be applied to any
iterative generator without increasing its complexity.
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Formally, for all generators 〈X, Y, f, g〉, the counter assisted modified
generator is in fact the iterative generator 〈X×{0, . . . , n−1}, Y, F,G〉,
where
F (x, i) = (f(x) + i (mod n), i+ 1 (mod n))
G(x, i) = g(x)
(1)
However, note that:
(1) The only secret part is located in the x coordinate,
(2) incrementing i has no cryptographical significance, and
(3) the output calculationG(x, i) is independent of the i-coordinate.
Thus applying diversity measures on the whole state spaceX×{0, . . . , n−
1}—that is, measuring the diversity of the sequences of pairs (xi, i),
i = 1, 2, . . .—is misleading (and, in fact, not informative). This is
why the diversity measure is focused on the actual state sequences
G(s) = (x0 = s, x1, . . . ) rather than on the sequence of pairs (xi, i).
Lemma 4.2. Let ~x = (x0, x1, x2, . . .) be a state sequence of a counter
assisted generator. Then for all i 6= j (mod n), if xi = xj then xi+1 6=
xj+1 and xi−1 6= xj−1.
Proof. We argue modulo n. By definition, xi+1 = f(xi) + (i + 1) and
xj+1 = f(xj)+(j+1). If xi = xj but i 6= j, then necessarily xi+1 6= xj+1.
Now, for the very same reason, xi−1 = xj−1 would imply xi 6= xj , which
is not the case. 
In other words, the sequence ~x has the interesting property that
equality at any pair of locations implies inequality at the pair of their
immediate successors and the pair of their immediate predecessors. We
call this the isolated equality property. This is the intuitive reason why
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counter assisted generators cannot enter short cycles: If they acciden-
tally generate the same value at several locations, all the subsequent
computations are guaranteed to diverge rather than converge.
Theorem 4.3.
(1) The black box modification technique modifying G : xi = f(xi−1)
to G ′ : xi = f(xi−1) + i (mod n) is max{g(k), h(k)}-diverse,
where
g(k) =
{√
k − 1 k ≤ n√
n n < k
, and h(k) =
{
k/| Im(f)| k ≤ n
n/| Im(f)| n < k .
(2) If the iteration function f is pseudorandom, then the state se-
quences generated from random seeds by the modified generator
are pseudorandom.
Proof. (1) We first show that g(k) ≤ DG′(k) for all k = 1, 2, . . . . Con-
sider any sequence of k consecutive values xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+k−1 (k ≤
n+1), and assume that it contains exactly ν distinct values. There are
ν2 possible ordered pairs of these values (a, b), and by Lemma 4.2 each
one of them can occur at most once in a consecutive pair of locations
(xj, xj+1) along the sequence. Since there are k − 1 such locations,
ν2 ≥ k − 1, which yields the desired lower bound on ν.
Next, we need to show that h(k) ≤ DG′(k) for all k = 1, 2, . . . . In a
sequence of k consecutive values xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+k−1 (k ≤ n + 1), each
xj is of the form cj + j, where cj ∈ Im(f). Since we add k distinct
values to at most | Im(f)| values, we get at least k/| Im(f)| distinct
values.
(2) We now sketch the proof of the pseudorandomness part. Consider
the following sequence of oracles, which accept a number k (which
is polynomial in log n) and output a sequence x1, . . . , xk ∈ X . (By
random we mean statistically independent and uniformly distributed.)
Oracle 1: Returns a random sequence xi ∈ X (i = 1, 2, . . . , k).
Oracle 2: Chooses a random seed x0 = s, and defines an f : X → X on
the fly, as follows:
(1) A flag Birthday is initially set to 0.
(2) For each i = 1, 2, . . . , k:
– If f(xi−1) is undefined, then choose a random y ∈ X
and define f(xi−1) = y.
– Otherwise, set Birthday = 1.
(3) Set xi = f(xi−1) + i.
The remaining values of f are chosen randomly.
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Oracle 3: Chooses a particular function f with uniform probability from
the set of all functions from X to X , chooses a random seed
x0 = s, and returns the sequence xi with xi = f(xi−1) + i,
i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Oracle 4: Same as Oracle 3, but with f pseudorandom instead of truly
random.
We say that two oracles are distinguishable if there exists a (not nec-
essarily polynomial time) algorithm (called distinguisher) which, for
some constant c > 0, given a sequence of length polynomial in log n,
can tell with probability greater than 1/ log(n)c which oracle has gen-
erated this sequence. Otherwise, the oracles are indistinguishable. It
is clear that Oracles 2,3 are indistinguishable. That Oracles 3,4 are
indistinguishable follows from the fact that any distinguisher of these
oracles can be used to construct a distinguisher of pseudorandom func-
tions from random ones.
It remains to show that Oracles 1,2 are indistinguishable. The only
possible constraint on the output of Oracle 2 happens when f is applied
twice to the same argument, that is, Birthday is set to 1. It is well-known
that for k << n, the probability that no birthday occurs is close to k
2
2n
[17], which is negligible if k is polynomial in logn. 
Remark 4.4. The upper bound k
2
2n
on the distinguishing probability is
tight: In probability close to k
2
2n
, a birthday xi = xj occurs and the
distinguisher can check that xi+1 − (i+ 1) = xj+1 − (j + 1). Provided
this, the probability that the output came from Oracle 1 is 1/n.
5. Asymptotic tightness of the provable diversity
The square root lower bound on the diversity may seem to be an arti-
fact of the proof technique. We first consider the purely combinatorial
version of the problem: What is the longest sequence one can construct
from ν distinct symbols which has the isolated equality property?
Lemma 5.1. For any positive integer ν, there exists a sequence of
length ν2 + 1 consisting of ν symbols and having the isolated equality
property.
Proof. Let C be a complete directed graph with ν vertices and ν2 di-
rected edges (including self loops). As the graph is connected and the
indegree and outdegree of each vertex in C is the same (= ν), the
graph is Eulerian. Let v0e0v1e1 . . . vν2−1eν2−1v0 be an Eulerian tour,
which includes each directed edge exactly once. Assume that for some
distinct i and j, vi = vj . If vi+1 = vj+1, then necessarily ei = ej,
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which is disallowed in Eulerian tours. Similarly, vi−1 = vj−1 would im-
ply ei−1 = ej−1. Consequently, the sequence has the isolated equality
property. 
This combinatorial result does not rule out the possibility that se-
quences created by counter assisted generators must satisfy additional
constrains, and as a result the lower bound in Theorem 4.3 can be im-
proved significantly. We will show that this is not the case: We prove
the asymptotic tightness of our lower bound by constructing for each
n a specific counter-assisted generator, such that the total diversities
of these counter-assisted generators are O(
√
n).
Theorem 5.2. There exist functions fn, n = 1, 2, . . . such that the
total diversities DtotalGn of the counter assisted generators Gn : xi =
fn(xi−1) + i (mod n) are O(
√
n).
Proof. Fix a natural number n. We will write for short f and G instead
of fn and Gn, respectively.
The state sequence of G will be based on two sequences: a0, a1, . . . , aα−1
and b0, b1, . . . , bβ−1 (the values of α and β will be determined later). The
sequences are “meshed” as follows:
(1) Locations with even indices contain only the ai values, and lo-
cations with odd indices contain only the bj values.
(2) The ai values occur in block order: The first β occurrences are
a0, the next β occurrences are a1, and so on.
(3) The bj values occur in cyclic order: The first β occurrences
are b0, . . . ,bβ−1 in this order, the next β occurrences are again
b0, . . . , bβ−1 in this order, and so on.
Putting these blocks in consecutive rows, we get a matrix C = (cij)
of size α× 2β, where ci,2j = ai and ci,2j+1 = bj :
C =

a0 b0 a0 b1 · · · a0 bβ−1
a1 b0 a1 b1 · · · a1 bβ−1
...
...
...
...
...
...
aα−1 b0 aα−1 b1 · · · aα−1 bβ−1

We define a function f for which the counter assisted generator G :
xi = f(xi−1) + i, seeded by x0 = a0, has state sequence equal to our
meshed sequence.
We begin with a few simple restrictions on our parameters. For
cyclicity the counter must return to 0 after 2αβ steps, that is, 2αβ = 0
(mod n). We will consider α’s and β’s such that 2αβ = n to make the
sequence shorter. The isolated equality property implies that all of the
ai and bj values are distinct. Thus, the total diversity will be α + β.
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Under these restrictions, we can see via elementary calculus that the
choice α = β =
√
n/2 yields the minimum possible total diversity of
α+ β =
√
2n values.
We thus begin with n’s for which n/2 is a square, and choose α =
β =
√
n/2.
We now consider the specific values of the elements in our meshed
sequence. The conditions are: ci,j+1 = f(cij) + 2βi + (j + 1), ci+1,0 =
f(ci,2β−1) + 2β(i + 1) − 1, and c00 = f(cα−1,2β−1) + 2αβ. In terms of
the ai and bj this is:
bj = f(ai) + 2βi+ (2j + 1)
ai = f(bj) + 2βi+ (2j + 2) (j = 0, . . . , β − 2)
ai = f(bβ−1) + 2βi
Setting x = f(a0), the first equation yields bj = x + (2j + 1) for
i = 0. Putting this back in the equation we get that f(ai) = x − 2βi
for all i. Similarly, the second equation implies (setting y = f(b0))
ai = y + 2βi + 2 and f(bj) = y − 2j for all j < β − 1. The third
equation with i = 0 gives f(bβ−1) = a0 = y + 2.
We therefore have, for any choice of x, y, the following requirements:
ai = y + 2 + 2βi
f7→ x− 2βi
bj = x+ 1 + 2j
f7→ y − 2j (j < β − 1)
bβ−1 = x− 1 + 2β f7→ y + 2
It is easy to check that any such definition yields the desired sequence of
states, as long as the resultant ai and bj ’s are disjoint. As we assume
that n is even, choosing any x and y having the same parity (e.g.,
x = y = 0) will do.
The values of f on X \ {ai, bj} can be arbitrary. It remains to check
that the sequence is repeated after every α · 2β steps. Indeed, the
counter will be 2αβ = 0 (mod n), and thus x2αβ = f(x2αβ−1) + 0 =
f(bβ−1) = a0, so we are right where we begun.
We now treat the cases where n/2 is not a square. Set α = β =
⌊√n/2 ⌋, and define ai, bj , and f as above. Now modify f(x) to
f(x mod 2αβ). The above argument shows that if we project the state-
sequence ~x modulo 2αβ, we get diversity at most α + β = O(
√
n).
Therefore, the actual diversity can be no more thanO(
√
n)·⌈n/(2αβ) ⌉ =
O(
√
n) · 2 = O(√n). 
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Remark 5.3. In most practical cases, n/2 is not a square and thus we
cannot achieve the exact
√
2n upper bound using our meshing con-
struction. However, in many cases n is an even power of 2 (e.g, 224,
232, 264, 2128, etc.), so we can choose α =
√
n and β =
√
n/2 (note that
2αβ = n) to get total diversity α + β = 3
√
n/2, which is close to the√
2n upper bound achieved in the case where n/2 was a square.
Our construction showed that the bound
√
n for the total diversity
is asymptotically tight. However, we do not have a construction where
DG(k) is O(
√
k) for all k simultaneously.
Open problem 5.4. Does there exist a constant c such that for all
sufficiently large n, there exists a counter-assisted generator G (with
state space of size n) such that DG(k) ≤ c
√
k for all k?
6. Cascade counter-assisted generators
In this section we generalize the notion of counter-assisted genera-
tors.
A Latin square is a binary function which is uniquely invertible given
its output and any one of the inputs. For example, the operations
x+ y (mod n), x− y (mod n) and x⊕ y are Latin square operations.
Moreover, every group operation is a Latin square operation, and if
x ⋆ y is a Latin square operation and P,Q, Z are permutations, then
Z(P (x) ⋆ Q(y)) is a Latin square operation. Let ⋆ be a Latin square
operation.
It is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 4.3 applies when the +i
modification is replaced by any Latin square operation ⋆i (unique in-
vertibility with respect to the i input guarantees the isolated equality
property, and unique invertibility with respect to the xi input guar-
antees the pseudorandomness of the states). We can thus extend the
concept of counter assisted generators to include these cases as well.
Remark 6.1. When n is a power of 2, we can use essentially the same
construction as in the proof of Theorem 5.2 to show the optimality of
the Ω(
√
n) lower bound when the +i (mod n) modification is replaced
by a ⊕i modification.
The next lemma shows that counter-mode generators are a degener-
ated case of counter-assisted generators.
Lemma 6.2. Every counter-mode generator is a counter-assisted gen-
erator.
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Proof. A counter-mode generator with ith output g(s ⋆ i) is equivalent
to the counter-assisted generator G = 〈f, g〉, where f ≡ s, and the Latin
square operation is ⋆, since in this case, xi = f(xi−1) ⋆ i = s ⋆ i. 
We can extend the notion of counter-assisted generators further.
Assume that G = 〈f, g,X, Y 〉 is an iterative generator, and let ~c =
〈c0, c1, . . .〉 be any sequence of elements in X . Define the sequence-
assisted generator G ⋆ ~c to be the generator whose ith state is xi =
f(xi−1) ⋆ ci (and whose ith output is g(xi)).
Theorem 6.3. Let G = 〈f, g〉 ⋆ ~c be a sequence-assisted generator.
Then:
(1) DG(k) ≥
√
D~c(k)− 1 for all k = 1, 2, . . . .
(2) If the the sequence ~c is pseudorandom, then the state sequence
of G is pseudorandom.
(3) If f is pseudorandom, then the state sequence of G is pseudo-
random.
Proof. (1) As in Lemma 4.2, we can show that ci 6= cj implies (xi−1, xi) 6=
(xj−1, xj). The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem
4.3(1).
(2) If the state sequence of G is not pseudorandom, then the sequence
~c can be distinguished from pseudorandom noise by considering 〈f, g〉⋆
~c, and looking at the state sequence of G.
(3) This is proved as in Theorem 4.3(2); the only difference is in the
definition of Oracle 3. 
Thus, any sequence ~c with large diversity can be used instead of a
counter. In particular, we can use the output of any of the generators
mentioned in Section 1.1.4 as the assisting sequence. In general, assume
that C is any generator with output in X . Define G ⋆ C = G ⋆ ~c, where
~c = 〈c0, c1, . . .〉 is the output sequence of C (note that the sequence ~c
depends of the initialization of C). The following definition is inductive.
Definition 6.4. G is a cascade counter-assisted generator if:
(1) G is a (standard) counter-assisted generator, or
(2) G = F ⋆C, where F is an iterative generator, ⋆ is a Latin square
operation, and C is a cascade counter-assisted generator.
In particular, we have:
Lemma 6.5. Every iterative generator is a cascade counter-assisted
generator.
Proof. If G is an iterative generator, and C is a generator with output
function 0, then G+C = G is a cascade counter-assisted generator. 
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Thus the notion of cascade counter-assisted generators extends those
of iterative, counter-mode and counter-assisted generators.
Ideally, all internal states of the cascaded generators (including the
starting position of the counter i) should be initialized by random,
independent seeds. If this is not feasible, one can, e.g., initialize the
“driving” generator or the counter with a random seed, and then clock
the cascade a few times to make all internal states depend on the
seed. In this case, however, caution must be taken to make sure that
particular choice of output functions does not make the influence of
the seed “vanish” while going down the cascade.
Example 6.6. Assume that the generators A, B, and C have state
spaces of size n = 2256 (256 bits). Assume further that the generator
C is counter-based with an invertible output function gC, and that the
output function gB of B is invertible as well. Consider the total diversity
of the cascade generator A + (B ⊕ C) (see Figure 3): As C is counter-
based, we have DC(n) = n. Thus by Theorem 6.3 (and discreteness),
DB⊕C(n) ≥ ⌈
√
n− 1⌉ = 2128, and DA+(B⊕C)(n) ≥ ⌈
√
DB⊕C(n)− 1⌉ ≥
264. Moreover, if the output function of C, or any of the iteration
functions of B, A is pseudorandom, then the state sequence of A is
pseudorandom as well. (We can also use, e.g., a maximal length LFSR
instead of the counter-based generator C to get the same results.)
6
5
+
+
i
+1
fB
fA
gB
gA
gC
1
2
3
4
Figure 3.
Remark 6.7. In this section we have seen that every iterative generator
can be viewed as a cascade counter-assisted generator (in a degenerate
manner). On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 4, every counter-
assisted generator can be viewed as an iterative generator (with a larger
state space). The advantage of our approach is that we focus on the
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cryptographical part of the generator, from which the output is calcu-
lated, rather than on the state of the whole system.
7. Generating sequences with maximal diversity
If we allow the design of a new output function g, then we can modify
any generator to have the maximal possible diversity DG(k) = k for all
k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Definition 7.1. Let G be any iterative generator. Modify its next-
state function as follows:
x2i+1 = f(x2i)
x2i+2 = f(x2i+1) + i
That is, the counter is incremented and added to the state value only
once every two iterations of the generator. The pair of generated
values (x2i, x2i+1) is used as the argument of a new output function
g′ : X × X → Y × Y . We call this mode of operation the two-step
counter-assisted mode. More generally, the t-step counter-assisted mode
is defined by incrementing and adding the counter once every t iter-
ations, and using each t-tuple as the input of a new output function
gˆ : X t → Y t. Formally, the t-step generator G = 〈f, g,X, Y 〉 with Latin
square operation ⋆i is the counter-assisted generator Gt = 〈fˆ , gˆ, X t, Y t〉
with the (injective) operation ⋆ˆi, where
• fˆ(x0, . . . , xt−1) = (f(xt−1), f 2(xt−1), . . . , f t(xt−1)),
• (x0, . . . , xt−1)⋆ˆi = (x0, . . . , xt−1 ⋆ i), and
• i is a cyclic counter in the range 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
Note that t-step counter-assisted generators require a state buffer of
size t.
x2
x1
f
x1
2
x’
g’
+
3
+1
i
4
Figure 4. A two-step counter-assisted generator
For all t ≥ 2, any t-step counter-assisted generator has maximal
possible diversity:
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Theorem 7.2. For any generator G = 〈f, g〉, and for all t ≥ 2, we
have the following:
(1) If f is pseudorandom, then the state sequences of Gt are pseu-
dorandom.
(2) DGt(k) = k for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. The proof of the pseudorandomness part is similar to that in
Theorem 4.3.
To prove the diversity part, assume that for some i 6= j (mod n) we
have equality between the t-tuples (xit, . . . , xit+t−1) and (xjt, . . . , xjt+t−1).
In particular, xit+t−2 = xjt+t−2. But this implies xit+t−1 = f(xit+t−2) +
i 6= f(xjt+t−2) + j = xit+t−1 (mod n), a contradiction. 
7.1. Black-box modifications of the output function g. If the
computational complexity of evaluating the new output function g′ in
the two-step mode is at most double that of evaluating g, then on
average, the computational complexity of obtaining the next output
does not change: We clock the generator twice, but we get two outputs
at once. If the output space Y is equal to X then we can get very close
to this without designing a new output function.
We will use the terminology of [13]. For a function g : X → X ,
define the Feistel permutation Dg : X × X → X ×X by Dg(L,R) def=
(R,L ⊕ g(R)). (Here too, any Latin square operation ⋆ can be used
instead of ⊕.)
If the output function g is key-dependent, then we can use a Luby-
Rackoff construction. Denote the key space by K, and assume that the
size of the key space is exponential in log n.
Theorem 7.3. Assume that the mapping κ 7→ gκ is pseudorandom,
and that κ1, κ2, and κ3 are pseudorandom elements of K. Then for
all functions f : X → X and seeds x0 ∈ X, the two-step generator
〈fˆ , Dgκ1 ◦Dgκ2 ◦Dgκ3 〉 has pseudorandom output.
Proof. By Theorem 7.2, for all iteration functions f and seeds x0 ∈ X ,
the inputs to Dgκ1 ◦ Dgκ2 ◦ Dgκ3 are all distinct. By a result of Luby
and Rackoff [11], this implies pseudorandomness of the output. 
This construction makes the output calculation slower by a factor of
3:2. The computational complexity of the following alternative is closer
to the desired optimum, and is a more straightforward modification.
Theorem 7.4. Assume that g : X → X is pseudorandom, and assume
that h : X → X is pseudorandomly chosen from a family H of functions
such that for all distinct x, y ∈ X and for all z ∈ X, the probability
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that h(x) ⊕ h(y) = z (h ∈ H) is negligible. Then for all functions
f : X → X and seeds x0 ∈ X, the two-step counter-assisted generator
〈fˆ , Dg ◦Dg ◦Dh〉 has pseudorandom output.
Proof. By a result of Lucks [12] (see also [13]), Dg ◦Dg ◦Dh is pseudo-
random. The rest of the proof is like in Theorem 7.3. 
There exist very efficient families H with the property mentioned in
Theorem 7.4 (see [13] for examples and references). Thus, the compu-
tational overhead of applying h is small, and the resulting generator
is almost as efficient as the original one. Note that, unlike the results
in earlier sections, we get here a black-box modification of an iterative
generator 〈f, g〉 which has maximal output diversity, and if either one
of the functions f or g is pseudorandom, then the output sequence is
pseudorandom.
Example 7.5. Let f = DES [14], g = RC5 [15], and hκ : {0, 1}64 →
{0, 1}64 be a function from Vazirani’s shift family (the ith bit of hκ(x) is∑n
i=1 xiκj+i−1 mod 2, see [13] and [19]). The two-step counter-assisted
generator 〈D̂ES, DRC5 ◦ DRC5 ◦ Dhκ〉 has maximal (state and output)
diversity k for all k = 1, 2, . . . , 264. On average, the calculation of any
output 64 bit block requires a single invocation of DES and a single
invocation of RC5. The execution time overhead of the rest of the
operations is negligible. Furthermore, if either one of the two functions
DES and RC5 is difficult to distinguish from random, then the output
sequence will be difficult to distinguish from random as well.
Open problem 7.6. Assume that both f and g are (truly) random,
and consider an output sequence of length m generated from a random
seed by the two-step counter-assisted generator G2 = 〈fˆ , Dg ◦ Dg〉.
What is the highest distinguishing probability between such a sequence
and a random sequence?
Remark 7.7. Using the results from [13], we get that for all t, the
output function of the t-step counter-assisted mode can be modified in
a black-box manner with a small computational overhead, to get the
same diversity and pseudorandomness results. See [13] for details.
Remark 7.8. In certain cases, when t is large (e.g., t ≥ 4) it is desirable
that the inputs to the t-step output function are distinct in as many
entries as possible (for example, this guarantees many active S-boxes
in differential cryptanalysis of the output function). We can achieve
this goal via letting the next state be the same as when clocking the
(standard) counter-assisted generator t times (that is, the counter is
incremented and added to the xi value every clock). By the isolated
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equality property, this guarantees that any two t-tuples are distinct in
at least ⌊t/2⌋ entries. In this mode of operation, the diversity remains
maximal as long as k < n/t.
7.2. Safe transition to new generations of cryptographic func-
tions. A common practice in the design of new generations of crypto-
graphic functions is to double the input and output length. Nowadays,
we experience the evolution from 64 bit functions (such as DES, RC5,
etc.) to 128 bit functions (such as the AES candidates [1]). The advan-
tage of old generation functions is that they have gone through years of
extensive academic research, and are thus well understood. It will take
a long time to gain similar confidence in the new generation functions.
Our two-step counter-assisted mode suggests a natural and straight-
forward way to combine new and old generation functions in a way that
if either one of them is pseudorandom, then the resulting generator is
pseudorandom: Assume that f is an old generation function and g is
a new generation function with double input size. Then we simply use
the two-step counter-assisted generator 〈fˆ , g〉.
Example 7.9. In Example 7.5, we can use RC6 instead ofDRC5◦DRC5◦
Dhκ as the output function. This results in a faster and more elegant
generator. Here too, the diversity is maximal for all k = 1, . . . , 264, and
the generator is difficult to distinguish from random if either DES or
RC6 is.
7.3. Cascaded multiple-step counter-assisted generators. If we
have enough state-space (this is usually the case with software en-
cryption), we can cascade multiple-step counter-assisted generators
without decreasing the diversity. Consider for example generators
G0,G1, . . . ,Gm−1 having the same state-space and output-space. For
any sequence of positive integers t0 < t1 < . . . < tm−1, and Latin-
square operations ⋆t0 , . . . , ⋆tm−2 (on spaces of size t0, t1, . . . , tm−2 blocks,
respectively), the (t0, t1, . . . , tm−1)-step cascade is defined to be
Gcascade = Gtm−1m−1 ⋆ˆtm−2 . . . ⋆ˆt1Gt11 ⋆ˆt0Gt00 .
In the sense of definition 6.4. Here, (x0, . . . , xtj+1−1)⋆ˆtj (y0, . . . , ytj−1) is
defined as the concatenation of (x0, . . . , xtj+1−tj−1) and (xtj+1−tj , . . . , xtj+1−1)⋆tj
(y0, . . . , ytj−1).
Using this notation, we have the following:
Theorem 7.10. For all generators G0,G1, . . . ,Gm−1 having the same
state-space and output-space, and for any Latin-square operations ⋆t0 , . . . , ⋆tm−2
(on spaces of size t0 < t1 < . . . < tm−2 blocks, respectively), the
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(t0, t1, . . . , tm−1)-step cascade Gcascade = Gtm−1m−1 ⋆ˆtm−2 . . . ⋆ˆt1Gt11 ⋆ˆt0Gt00 has
the following properties:
(1) DGcascade(k) = k for all k = 1, 2, . . . n.
(2) If either the iteration or the output function of any of the cas-
caded generators is pseudorandom, then the output of Gcascade is
pseudorandom as well.
Proof. (1) follows from Theorem 7.2, by induction on m. (2) follows
readily from Theorem 6.3. 
8. Concluding remarks and further research
We have presented a new mode of operation which makes the diver-
sity of every state sequence provably large with a negligible computa-
tional cost. Unlike other solutions, this mode does not introduce new
(trivial) risks. The well known threat of “no available theory” on the
cycle structure of complicated iterative generators (see, e.g., [4, p. 525],
[3, p. 22], [16, §17.6], and [6, p. 347]) is eliminated. It is important to
stress, however, that the diversity measures only one aspect of security,
and is clearly not sufficient for evaluating the cryptographical strength
of the generator.
Our new mode has various possible implementations via multiple-
stepping and/or cascading, which allow the user a wide range of choice
to fit the implementation to his constraints and needs. All of the
suggested modes require a counter, but in most of the applications
a counter either already exists or is easy to maintain. The cascaded
mode reduces the provable diversity with respect to the simple counter-
assisted mode, but it suggests an interesting new way to combine the
cryptographic strength of several generators. The multiple-stepping
mode requires a larger state buffer (thus may be more suitable in soft-
ware applications), but assures perfect diversity.
The cryptographical impact of our modification technique when the
functions f or g are not pseudorandom remains open. It is easy to
find pathological examples of output functions where the modification
makes things worse, but we believe that such pathological cases will be
easy to inspect. However, if the user wants complete confidence, then
he may wish to replace the output function g by one that he trusts.
In this case, it may be worthwhile to use the generator in the two-step
mode and gain the maximal possible diversity as in Section 7.
As we have proved, in the multiple-stepping modes it is enough that
either the iteration or the output function is pseudorandom to obtain
pseudorandom output. This suggests combining two functions from
“orthogonal” sources, such as in Example 7.5, and combining strength
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of well studied primitives with with new, promising ones, as in Example
7.9.
The counter-assisted mode suggests many open problems. Some of
these problems are mentioned in the paper. To these we can add
practical problems such as the challenge of finding a seed s for which
the counter-assisted generator with DES as the iteration function has
DDES(s)(k) ≈
√
k for some large k, and theoretical problems such as
statistical analysis of the behavior of the state sequence of counter-
assisted generators.
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